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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Kenneth Hallquist appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, he contends that the district court erred 
when it dismissed his claim that he was coerced into waiving the preliminary hearing. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In 2014, Hallquist pleaded guilty to felony intimidating a witness and two counts 
of violation of a no-contact order.  (R., pp.6, 69-70.)  On July 25, 2014, the district court 
entered judgment against Hallquist and imposed a unified sentence of five years with 
one year fixed on the witness intimidation charge, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., p.5.)  
Hallquist never filed an appeal from that judgment.1  The judgment therefore became 
final on September 5, 2014.  Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district 
court placed Hallquist on probation.  (Id.)  Hallquist filed a Rule 35 motion for leniency, 
which the district court denied.  See State v. Hallquist, Docket No. 43268, 2016 
Unpublished Op. No. 342 (Idaho App., Jan. 26, 2016).  Hallquist appealed that denial, 
and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.  Id. 
More than a year and a half after judgment became final in his criminal case, on 
March 28, 2016, Hallquist filed his petition for post-conviction relief.2  (R., pp.5-17.)  In 
                                            
1  While Hallquist did file a Rule 35 motion and appeal from the district court’s 
subsequent denial of that motion, that appeal cannot serve as an appeal from the 
judgment.  State v. Mosqueda, 123 Idaho 858, 859, 853 P.2d 603, 604 (Ct. App. 1993). 
  
2  Clearly Hallquist’s petition for post-conviction relief, as it related to challenges to his 
judgment of conviction, was not timely.  See I.C. § 19-4902 (“An application may be filed 
at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal.…”).  However, 
2 
his petition, he alleged that he was entitled to relief based on various claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.  (R., pp.6-16.)  The 
state filed a motion to dismiss Hallquist’s petition for post-conviction relief on the 
grounds that he had failed to support his bare and conclusory claims with admissible 
evidence and some of those claims were otherwise disproved by the record.  (R., 
pp.123-40.)  The district court granted the state’s motion.  (R., pp.143-45.)  Hallquist 
filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.147-49.) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
as the statute of limitations issue does not appear to have been raised below, the state 
will not address it further in this appeal. 
3 
ISSUE 
Hallquist states the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Did the district court err when it dismissed one of Mr. Hallquist’s 
claims for post-conviction relief on an improper basis? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.) 
 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Hallquist failed to show that the district court erred when it granted the 





Hallquist Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Summary Dismissal Of His 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Hallquist asserts that by granting the state’s motion for summary 
dismissal, the district court dismissed on an erroneous basis his claim that he was 
coerced into waiving the preliminary hearing through threats.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7.)  
Application of the correct legal standards to Hallquist’s petition, however, shows no 
error in the district court’s summary dismissal. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file 
….”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
 
C. Hallquist Is Not Entitled To Post-Conviction Relief 
 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act.  I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.  A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a 
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing that he is entitled to relief.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).  Generally, the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for post-conviction relief.  Pizzuto v. 
State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008).  However, unlike other civil 
5 
complaints, in post-conviction cases the “application must contain much more than a 
short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 
8(a)(1).”  Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)).  
Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that “specifically set[s] forth 
the grounds upon which the application is based.”  Id. (citing I.C. § 19-4903).  “The 
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.”  State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party’s motion.  “To withstand summary dismissal, 
a post-conviction applicant must present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to 
each element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.”  State 
v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 
581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)).  Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal “if the applicant’s evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact” 
as to each element of the petitioner’s claims.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 
802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.  While a 
court must accept a petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required 
to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d 
at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)).  
“Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when 
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(1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not 
justify relief as a matter of law.”  Id.   
Hallquist raised his claims regarding his waiver of the preliminary hearing, at 
least in part, as ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  (See R., pp.10, 13.)  Where 
the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, he 
must show that his attorney’s performance was objectively deficient and that he was 
prejudiced by that deficiency.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988).  To establish 
deficient performance, the petitioner must overcome the strong presumption that 
counsel’s performance was adequate and “show that his attorney’s conduct fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 154, 
177 P.3d 362, 368 (2008) (citations omitted).  To establish prejudice, the petitioner must 
show “a reasonable probability that but for his attorney’s deficient performance the 
outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”  Id.   
The state moved to dismiss Hallquist’s claims relating to the waiver of the 
preliminary hearing and entry of his guilty plea on the bases that they were bare and 
conclusory and disproved by the record.  (R., p.132.)  Hallquist asserted that he waived 
the preliminary hearing and pleaded guilty due to the threat of the state bringing 
additional charges.  (See R., pp.9, 13, 62-63.)  This assertion was belied by his guilty 
plea advisory form, in which Hallquist specifically represented: “No one has made any 
promises or threats to get me to plead guilty in this action.”  (R., p.69.)  The guilty plea 
advisory form also set forth the additional charges Hallquist avoided by waiving the 
preliminary hearing and pleading guilty: an unspecified number of “additional VNCOs 
7 
based on facts in the instant case” and “charges in connection with a Valentine’s day 
card [defendant] allegedly requested to be sent by a third party.”  (R., p.70.)  The state’s 
agreement to forego filing additional charges (which Hallquist never claimed were 
unsupported) in consideration for a defendant’s waiver of the preliminary hearing and 
guilty plea does not render that waiver and plea involuntary.  Finally, Hallquist asserted 
that if he had had the preliminary hearing, he would have been able to get his felony 
charge dismissed with prejudice.  (R., p.9.)  This assertion is pure speculation 
unsupported by any evidence.   
On appeal, Hallquist narrows the issue from alleged threats coercing his 
decisions to waive the preliminary hearing and plead guilty to only the issue of his 
waiver of the preliminary hearing.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7.)  Hallquist notes that while 
his guilty plea advisory form may demonstrate that his guilty plea was not coerced by 
threats, it does not show that his waiver of the preliminary hearing was not coerced.  
(Id., p.7.)  But a valid guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, 
whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings.  State v. Kelchner, 130 Idaho 
37, 39, 936 P.2d 680, 682 (1997); State v. Book, 127 Idaho 352, 354, 900 P.2d 1363, 
1365 (1995).  Even had the prosecutor and defense attorney coerced Hallquist into 
waiving the preliminary hearing by threatening him with the filing of additional charges 
(which, again, Hallquist never argued were unsupported), any challenge to this alleged 
error in the proceedings was waived by Hallquist’s subsequent valid guilty plea.  Unless 
Hallquist is also challenging the validity of his guilty plea, Hallquist’s claim regarding his 
waiver of the preliminary hearing does not justify relief as a matter of law, and the 
district court correctly dismissed it.   
8 
On his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Hallquist failed to present 
sufficient evidence to support either prong of the Strickland standard.  He failed to show 
any grounds for relief based on his waiver of the preliminary hearing, and the district 
court correctly granted the state’s motion for summary dismissal on this basis.  Hallquist 
has failed to show error in the district court’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition.  
The district court should therefore be affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order 
granting the state’s motion for summary dismissal. 
 DATED this 31st day of July, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer_________ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
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